

27 January 1970

EXDIR - COMPT.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : CIA Emergency Planning

1. This memorandum is in response to your request for a study of the emergency planning program. It is addressed to the requirements of the basic directives which require an emergency planning program and shows, in practical terms, what communications, housing, office and other facilities we have to satisfy those requirements; what it is costing us to maintain these facilities in terms of manpower, space and equipment; anything we may have that is superfluous or unnecessary; and whether the scope of the plan and facilities as developed are adequate to meet the intended purpose of a relocation plan for the Agency at its present size and level of complexity.

2. The most current policy directive on emergency preparedness is Executive Order 11490 dated October 30, 1969. In this document President Nixon reaffirmed previous instructions on the subject of emergency planning and updated specific functional guidance to some 28 departments and federal agencies. There were no significant changes from the written policy of previous administrations. As in previous issuances on this subject there was no reference to intelligence community functions or command relationships nor was CIA assigned specific emergency planning functions.

3. CIA's responsibilities for emergency planning are contained in the general section of this Executive Order on the purpose and scope of emergency planning applicable to all departments and agencies. Part 1, Section 102, paragraph (b) states:

"The departments and agencies of the Federal Government are hereby severally charged with the duty of assuring the continuity of the Federal Government in any national emergency type situation that might confront the nation. To this end, each department and agency with essential functions, whether expressly identified in this order or not, shall develop such plans and take such actions, including but not limited to those specified in this order, as may be necessary to assure that it will be able to perform its essential functions, and continue as a viable part of the Federal Government, during

any emergency that might conceivably occur. These include plans for maintaining the continuity of essential functions of the department or agency at the seat of government and elsewhere, through programs concerned with: (1) succession to office; (2) predelegation of emergency authority; (3) safekeeping of essential records; (4) emergency relocation sites supported by communications and required services; (5) emergency action steps; (6) alternate headquarters or command facilities; and (7) protection of Government resources, facilities, and personnel. The continuity of Government activities undertaken by the departments and agencies shall be in accordance with guidance provided by, and subject to evaluation by, the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness."

4. As Executive Agent for the President on emergency planning the Director of OEP is charged with the responsibility (Section 206 of Executive Order 11051) for reviewing all measures being undertaken by Federal Agencies with respect to the physical security and protection of facilities important to defense mobilization including those under the provisions of emergency preparedness assignments to such agencies and shall recommend to the President such actions as are necessary to strengthen such measures. The CIA emergency planning programs have always been, and continue to be, excluded from inspection and review functions of the Director, OEP.

5. In developing a rational program on emergency planning the Agency must distinguish between the printed word of official pronouncement and the actualities of an unstated but tangible attitude which has arisen the past few years. Congress has consistently refused to appropriate money to implement any of the proposals made by OEP or individual departments and agencies in support of a meaningful emergency relocation program. The classic illustration of this attitude was the refusal to authorize the expenditure of so much as one nickel for the hardening of emergency relocation sites, even after Presidential approval of a Cabinet paper urgently recommending that measure back in 1959.

6. In spite of the recent publication of a new Executive Order by President Nixon (EO 11490) reaffirming and supporting the original policy promulgated by earlier administrations, OEP as the President's executive agent for emergency preparedness has taken a passive role in implementing a meaningful national program. Meetings and conferences called by OEP have dropped sharply during the past year (none since March 1969). Planning activity remains on a status quo basis, old plans are reissued and redated but not significantly changed and there is no active direction, incentive or inducement to push ahead to seek

funds and manpower for realistic emergency programs. This attitude reflects the unwritten policy inherent in the fundamental change in the United States Soviet Bloc relationship of the past few years, whereby the crisis atmosphere of the 1950s and early 60s has passed and we are now concentrating our efforts on lessening tension and engaging in international arms talks, strategic weapons control agreements and the like. Thus an active, elaborate, expensive emergency preparedness program would be politically unacceptable and impossible to fund.

7. To meet our emergency preparedness responsibilities of Executive Order 11490 as enumerated in the seven general program areas cited in paragraph 2 above, it is proposed that our plan be in outline form and so structured that the principle provisions of the relocation and vital records programs could be rapidly implemented. We must recognize the fact that fund and manpower limitations prohibit realistic planning for continuity of essential functions in the event of surprise thermonuclear attack. As an intelligence organization our plans should be based on the assumption that we will have sufficient advance warning to implement the logistics, personnel documentation, and vital materiel aspects of our relocation planning.

8. Of the seven program areas mentioned in Executive Order 11490 (paragraph 2 above) three are not applicable to the CIA as these programs (2, 5 and 6) are concerned with departments and agencies with large domestic regional offices or who have been assigned specific emergency action steps in the Federal Emergency Plan. The remaining four programs applicable to CIA are detailed in the attachments to this memorandum and contain recommendations for changes in our current planning posture in these programs:

a. Tab A: Program for Emergency Succession of Key Officials.

b. Tab B: Vital Records Program (Safekeeping of Essential Records).


c. Tab C: Program for Emergency Relocation Sites Supported by Communications and Required Services.

d. Tab D: Program for Protection of Government Resources, Facilities, and Personnel.

9. In conclusion we must recognize that if we go by a literal interpretation of written policy and directives on emergency planning our programs are woefully inadequate. However, if we can judge our programs in relation to the actualities of the present intentions of

the President and Congress as to what portion of our national assets are to be committed to non-military emergency preparedness, then we might conclude that the present scope of CIA programs adequately meet the current intended purposes of emergency preparedness planning. The recommended modification in our current emergency planning programs summarized below, reflect a realistic adjustment of assets presently committed to emergency planning and are consistent with our desires to maintain a planning framework for emergency relocation which could be implemented should the need arise.

10. Assuming the Agency's liaison responsibilities with the Office of Emergency Planning will remain at the same low level of activity we have experienced the past 18 months and that our participation in the Interagency Emergency Preparedness Committee (IEPC) stays at its current status of relative inactivity, the DDS/Support Services Staff can absorb these external liaison functions. Mr.

STAT the Agency's Vital Records Program Officer, has the required background, knowledge and liaison experience in the government emergency planning community and is well qualified to assume the external liaison mantel of the Agency's Emergency Planning Officer. 

11. As described in Tab D, the Agency's most active, fully staffed, and well defined emergency preparedness program is that presently administered by the Office of Security in fulfilling its responsibilities for the protection of government resources, facilities, and personnel. Through the CIA Emergency Security Patrol, the Security Command Center, and a network of Building Emergency Officers (assigned by the various Directorates) the Office of Security has a variety of identifiable resources committed to emergency preparedness programs. In the past the Office of Security has shouldered the bulk of our emergency planning functions working in concert with the CIA Emergency Planning Officer and the Building Emergency Officers in the various Directorates. With the transfer of the CIA Emergency Planning Officer function to the DDS, the Office of Security is best prepared to assume the general functions previously assigned to the CIA Emergency Planning Officer. As suggested above external liaison with OEP could be absorbed by the Support Services Staff, however, as the other planning functions of CIA Emergency Planning Officer (set forth in STAT are now paralled in the Office of Security these functions should be absorbed into present emergency preparedness programs in the Office of Security.

12. It is, therefore, recommended that the DDS seek Executive Director approval of the following concepts and or changes in the Emergency Planning Program:

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a. [] be appointed the CIA Emergency Planning Officer for purposes of external liaison and coordination with OEP and IEPC. All other functions and responsibilities of the CIA Emergency Planning Officer set forth in [] be assigned to the Director of Security and pertinent regulations be so amended.

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b. Continue current level of activity in the Program for Emergency Succession of Key Officials, recognizing that certain basic aspects which detail the conditions under which succession will take place, methods of notification, tenure of authority, and indoctrination programs are lacking.

c. The current scope and level of effort devoted to the Vital Records program be maintained, reaffirming the present operating policy which charges individual organizational components having non-hard copy deposits in Vital Records with the responsibility for earmarking specialized equipment now in use in their offices for transfer [] under a emergency relocation situation to insure the usability of their Vital Records deposits.

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d. All emergency supplies, materiel, and equipment (excluding communications gear) not used in support of ongoing [] activities be removed [] and relocated as detailed in page 3, Tab C, thus freeing urgently needed space for current operations.

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e. The Emergency Relocation Force roster be maintained on a position and job title basis rather than the present individual name basis.

[]
Deputy Chief,
Support Services Staff

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Attachments
Tabs A through D

27 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, SSS

THROUGH : Chief, Records Administration Branch

SUBJECT : Report of Vital Records Activity

25X1 This report and attached statistical Compilation reflects pertinent facts in regard to the current Vital Records activity of each Agency component. Miss [] of the Agency Office of Emergency Planning and Mr. [] Archives and Records Center, were very helpful in obtaining information used in compiling this report.

It is to be pointed out that this is not to be interpreted as an in depth report. To conduct an in depth study would require at least a month and involve all Records Officers. However, we did single out 4 offices (Finance, ONE, TSD, and OCS) for a more thorough study than the cursory review made of the remaining majority of Agency offices.

This review provided us with the following general information:

- A. Number of Offices with Vital Records Deposit Schedules - 44
or a statement to the effect that they did not have
need for depositing Vital Records.
- B. Number of offices that deposited Vital Records during - 37
1969.
- C. Number of offices that have revised their Vital - 6
Records Schedules in 1969.
- D. Number of deposits in 1969. 1710
- E. Volume of records deposited in 1969 1042 (cu. ft.)
- F. Volume of records superseded (withdrawn, 1010 (cu. ft.)
transferred or destroyed) in 1969
- G. Number of offices who have included their Records - 17
Officers on the Relocation Force.


GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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In order that you may have a little better understanding of the above, I have included a statement elaborating on each of the points A thru G:

- A. Attempts have been made to have a Vital Records Schedule for each Agency office. In the event that the individual office did not feel that they had an Emergency mission to perform we then requested a statement to that effect. At the present time we have schedules from 42 offices and negative statements from 2 offices.
- B. This figure indicates that 37 of the 42 offices that have determined the need to deposit Vital Records, made deposits in 1969. Without conducting detailed item by item review it is impossible to know whether or not these 37 offices are 100% current. It is essential that a review be made of the remaining inactive 5 offices.
- C. This would lead one to think that this number of 6 offices is all too few. It could be and then again it may not be all alarming. The only way we can tell is to obtain information regarding changes or revisions to the specific Emergency Mission of each office. Without a clearly stated goal or objective we cannot expect Records Officers to select the essential records. We have always advocated at least an Annual review, but have also informed Records Officers to amend their schedules as soon as their requirements necessitate additions or deletions to their deposit schedules.
- D. This number indicates an active program. I have always felt that we have activity, but my main concern has been, do we have the correct records necessary to carry out our emergency assignments? Most of our Records Officers are 100% behind the Vital Records Program, but insist that they do not receive guidance from their E.P.O.
- E. A comparison of this item (Volume of records deposited) with the following item F (Volume of records superseded) indicates, records-wise at least, that we have a very active program. The basic ingredients for a good Vital Records Program are that the records be current and that they be protected as soon as generated. The fact that in 1969 we deposited over 1,000 cubic feet, and yet the volume on hand at end of 1969 showed an increase of only 32 cubic feet is indicative of a good program.
- F. This reflects the results of our updating process. During the year 1,010 cubic feet were replaced by more current records.

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- G. The actual number of Records Officers included on the Relocation Team surprised me. I had no idea that 17 offices had included their Records Officers. This must have occurred in the past couple of years because I checked with Mary before on this and only a few were included.

In addition to this general type review and, in accordance with your request we selected 4 offices in which we conducted a closer review which uncovered the following situations, some favorable, some questionable.

Office of National Estimates

A close review of the ONE depositing activity indicated that only 3 deposits of Vital Records were made in 1969. These deposits were made in February, June and October. Although these deposits included 147 different papers, reports, etc., our review showed that at least one item (Drafts of NIE's) were not deposited. I believe that it is necessary that ONE reexamine their Vital Records Schedule. It was last revised in 1961. The repository received only 3 specific categories of records while the schedule calls for the deposit of some 14 different categories.

Technical Services Division


The TSD schedule lists 32 items. There were 12 deposits in 1969 all concerned with one item of the 32 listed items on the schedule. On 3 July 1969 TSD requested the return of their Vital Records Deposits. Ten of these 12 deposits were made subsequent to the July withdrawal. Because of the lack of their vital records and lack of operational equipment it would seem impossible that TSD could perform a vital mission.

Office of Finance

The Office of Finance has a very active Vital Records Program with deposits in some divisions being made at least every pay period (2 weeks). Concerning 2 items, one of the Compensation and Tax Division and one the Office of Finance itself, there were 29 and 33 deposits made in 1969. In all the Office of Finance deposited 497 items during the year.

Even with this activity, when we checked each scheduled item with the actual deposits, we found that there were no deposits made of some of the scheduled items. It is possible that some of these are no longer prepared or they are no longer considered Vital. In either event, it is evident that the schedule must be revised or the division responsible for depositing these must correct this deficiency.

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Office of Computer Services

The Office of Computer Services has 5 items on their Vital Records Schedule. During the entire calendar year 1969 they made only one deposit. This was a replacement to the OCS Procedures Manual. The remaining 283 cubic feet of vital records were deposited prior to 1969. I feel that OCS should be depositing back-up tapes to their various computer reels. We have discussed this with them several times, but they favored retaining their back-up reel at Headquarters. This is extremely precarious as was vividly pointed out by the experience of the Air Force when they suffered the loss of Tapes in a serious Pentagon fire.

I feel that before we take corrective action we should request that the Scope of our total Emergency Program be amended in order that it will be well defined, realistic, approved by the Director and understood by all Agency Emergency Planners. With his approval, we will then be able to cite the necessary authority which is essential if we expect to receive effective compliance.

In addition to establishing the Scope of our emergency program we must enumerate the type of emergencies we must protect against and finally determine how much "insurance" we will need. Once the Scope, eventualities and degree of protection are defined, we should then perform an in depth review of the Vital Records Schedules and depositing activity of each of the 42 offices, evaluate our findings and implement the type program that will assure us of adequate protection.

One of the greatest threats to Records is Fire. Many industrial Records Protection programs came into being because of case studies that told of disastrous losses due to fires, floods, hurricane, etc. Statisticians tell us that 43% of all businesses that lose their records due to fire go out of business within six months after the loss of their records. We cannot take this chance with our records. We must maintain an effective Records protective program.



Records Management Officer

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Attachment:
Chart

DDS/SSS/RAB  s (27 Jan 70)

Distribution

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1 - RAB File

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